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INCENTIVIZE PHARMACEUTICAL
INNOVATION: THE POTENTIAL OF CLAIMS
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ABSTRACT
The pharmaceutical industry relies on innovation. However, many
innovative firms are cutting their research and development
investments and seeing their new product pipelines dry up, due in part
to a lack of sufficient patent protection. This Note identifies two major
factors that have caused this inadequacy in patent protection. First,
pharmaceutical patents are challenged early and often by generic
manufacturers, as encouraged by the 1984 Hatch-Waxman Act.
Second, the scope of pharmaceutical-patents is sometimes unduly
restrained due to limited application of the doctrine of equivalents.
Consequently, pharmaceutical patents, especially drug-product
patents, are easily designed around and cannot offer the protection
necessary for innovative firms to recoup their developmental costs.
This Note argues for a wider application of means-plus-function
clauses in pharmaceutical patents as a potential cure for this problem.
Means-plus-function claims, although authorized by Congress in the
1952 Patent Act, have not been explored much in the pharmaceutical
context. This Note argues that this claiming strategy is not only
appropriate but also particularly effective for pharmaceutical patents.
Means-plus-function claims would give drug-product patents
adequate scope even with the limited use of the doctrine of equivalents
and thus would provide the protection necessary for innovative firms
to withstand frequent attacks by generic manufacturers. Finally, this
Note examines issues anticipated with applying means-plus-function
claims to pharmaceutical patents and proposes possible solutions.
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INTRODUCTION
The United States Constitution endows Congress with the
authority to grant inventors time-limited, exclusive rights “[t]o
1
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.” Pursuant to this
authority, Congress established the patent system to give inventors
temporary rights to exclude others from making, using, or selling their
2
inventions or importing them into the United States. These exclusive
rights allow inventors to profit from their ideas, thus providing strong
3
financial incentives for innovation.
Traditionally, the patent system has been considered successful
4
in promoting innovation in the pharmaceutical industry. Currently,
however, a number of branded pharmaceutical companies face the
daunting reality of losing patent coverage on their most lucrative
5
drugs, creating what is known as the “patent cliff” phenomenon. To
be sure, the expiration of such drug patents and the subsequent
market entry of generic versions of branded drugs means significant
6
savings for consumers. This phenomenon, however, also raises
concern for the future of new drug development. In the past few
years, loss of patent protection has caused sales revenue for

1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
2. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2006), amended by Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L.
No. 112-29, §§ 3(j), 20(j)(1), 125 Stat. 284, 290, 335 (2011).
3. Kelly A. Gidcumb, Rethinking the Hatch-Waxman Act: Balancing Both Sides of the
Equation, 6 WAKE FOREST INTELL. PROP. L.J. 23, 26 (2006).
4. See C. Scott Hemphill & Bhaven N. Sampat, When Do Generics Challenge Drug
Patents?, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 613, 613 (2011) (“The pharmaceutical industry is the
rare setting in which the patent system works as it is supposed to—or so the story goes.”);
Matthew J. Higgins & Stuart J.H. Graham, Balancing Innovation and Access: Patent Challenges
Tip the Scales, 326 SCIENCE 370, 370 (2009) (“[T]here is little debate that [patents] are
important for spurring drug innovation.”).
5. See Katie Reid, Update 4—Novartis To Cut 2,000 Jobs To Save Annual $200 Mln,
REUTERS, Oct. 25, 2011, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/10/25/novartisidUSL5E7LP10G20111025 (“Global drugmakers have cut tens of thousands of jobs ahead of
patent expirations on their top-selling products . . . .”); Duff Wilson, Patent Woes Threatening
Drug Firms, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2011, at A1 (“This year alone, because of patent expirations,
the drug industry will lose control over more than 10 megamedicines whose combined annual
sales have neared $50 billion.”).
6. See, e.g., Ranit Mishori, Why Are Generic Drugs Cheaper Than Brand-Name Ones?,
WASH. POST (July 11, 2011), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2011-07-11/national/
35267296_1_generic-drugs-manufacturers-of-brand-name-drugs-pharmaceutical-companies
(“Generic makers don’t face the same costs as manufacturers of brand-name drugs. . . . [T]he
brand-name maker often invented the drug, a process that can cost hundreds of millions of
dollars. . . . [The brand-name maker’s] investment also includes advertising . . . . For a generic
manufacturer, no such investment is required—not in development and not in marketing.”).
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innovative firms to plummet, compelling them to restructure to
7
survive financially. As a part of this restructuring, many firms have
heavily cut their investments in research and development (R&D) for
8
new products.
Widespread reduction in R&D investment is particularly
alarming because the pharmaceutical industry is very research
9
intensive and heavily depends on product innovation. Over the years,
developing a new drug has become increasingly expensive, time10
consuming, and risky. On average, developing a new medicine and
securing Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approval requires
11
screening between five and ten thousand compounds. This process
12
takes on average ten to fifteen years and costs $1.3 billion. Indeed,
with shrinking R&D investment and increasingly costly drug
development, a number of branded pharmaceutical firms have
experienced a drying up of their new-product pipelines in the past

7. See, e.g., Drugmaker AstraZeneca To Cut 1,150 U.S. Employees, USA TODAY (Dec. 7,
2011), http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/health/drugs/story/2011-12-07/Astra-zenecalayoffs/51708132/1 (“Drugmaker AstraZeneca will cut roughly 24% of its U.S. sales force in an
effort to curb costs, part of a company-wide restructuring announced in 2010.”).
8. See, e.g., Daniel Cressey, Pfizer Slashes R&D, 470 NATURE 154, 154 (2011) (“With key
patents about to expire, Pfizer, the world’s largest pharmaceutical company in terms of sales,
unveiled plans to slash its research and development (R&D) spending by billions and cut
thousands of jobs.”); Sten Stovall, R&D Cuts Curb Brain-Drug Pipeline, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 27,
2011),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704474804576222463927753954.html
(“Many companies . . . have recently scaled back their research into how the brain works and
affects behavior.”); Lori Valigra, Biotech Companies Cut R&D Spending, Maintain Cash
Reserves, BDO Study Says, MASS HIGH TECH (July 29, 2011, 2:19 PM EDT),
http://www.masshightech.com/stories/2011/07/25/daily54-Biotech-companies-cut-RD-spendingmaintain-cash-reserves-BDO-study-says.html (“R&D efforts may be a mission critical activity
for biotech companies, but a new report says public biotechs have cut spending for the second
straight year . . . .”).
9. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, PUB. NO. 2589, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 9 (2006), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/
cbofiles/ftpdocs/76xx/doc7615/10-02-drugr-d.pdf (stating that the percentage of total sales
revenue that is invested in R&D at an average pharmaceutical company is five times higher
than that at the average manufacturing firm).
10. PHARM. RESEARCH & MFRS. OF AM., PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 2011 PROFILE 10
(2011), available at http://catalyst.phrma.org/wp-content/uploads/fromPhrma/phrma_profile
_2011_final.pdf. The major factors behind the increase in the time and cost of new drug
development include (1) heightened regulatory requirements regarding trial size and length; and
(2) the increased cost of animal testing and conducting clinical trials. Michael Dickson & Jean
Paul Gagnon, Key Factors in the Rising Cost of New Drug Discovery and Development, 3
NATURE REVS.: DRUG DISCOVERY 417, 420, 426 (2004).
11. PHARM. RESEARCH & MFRS. OF AM., supra note 10, at 12 fig.4.
12. Id. at 10.
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decade, indicating an industry-wide decrease in innovative activities.
Because the development of new health-improving or even life-saving
drugs relies on pharmaceutical innovation, the potential social loss is
difficult to estimate.
Many factors both within and outside of the patent system have
14
contributed to this decline in pharmaceutical innovation. This Note
examines the combined effect of two factors within the patent system:
the increased generic competition faced by innovative firms and the
15
inadequacy in patent-claim scope for certain pharmaceutical patents.
It then explores the unrecognized potential of claims with meansplus-functions clauses (MPF claims) to remedy these problems and
revitalize pharmaceutical innovation.
The enactment of the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term
16
Restoration Act of 1984 (Hatch-Waxman Act) has rendered
innovative firms more vulnerable to patent challenges and provided
great economic incentives for generic manufacturers to initiate these
17
challenges as early as possible. Although intended to strike a
balance between innovative firms and generic manufacturers, the
Hatch-Waxman Act has been widely criticized for unevenly favoring
18
the generic side of the industry. Since its passage, the United States
13. Lori Valigra, AstraZeneca, Biogen Look Externally for New Drug Candidates, MASS
HIGH TECH (May 23, 2011, 2:02 PM EDT), http://www.masshightech.com/stories/2011/05/23/
daily10-AstraZeneca-Biogen-look-externally-for-new-drug-candidates.html.
14. Some factors outside the patent system include the high cost of drug development and
inefficiencies in the research community. See generally Arti K. Rai, Jerome H. Reichman, Paul
F. Uhlir & Colin Crossman, Pathways Across the Valley of Death: Novel Intellectual Property
Strategies for Accelerated Drug Discovery, 8 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 1, 4 (2008)
(outlining the major obstacles to producing and developing new small-molecule drugs and
proposing a solution); supra note 8 and accompanying text.
15. Claims are specific sections in a U.S. patent. Each claim defines the scope of the
patented invention—that is, the right protected by the patent document. See infra text
accompanying notes 97–100.
16. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417,
98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15, 21, 28, & 35 U.S.C.).
17. See infra Part I.C.
18. See Gerald J. Mossinghoff, Overview of the Hatch-Waxman Act and Its Impact on the
Drug Development Process, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 187, 187 (1999) (“For those who ask whether
Hatch-Waxman was a good deal or a bad deal for the research-based pharmaceutical industry,
the most learned response is: It was not a good deal . . . .”); Jaclyn L. Miller, Note, Drug Price
Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act: The Elimination of Competition Between Drug
Manufacturers, 5 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 91, 103 (2002) (“These benefits [bestowed by the
Hatch-Waxman Act] create an unequal playing field that inhibits true competition.”); Mandy
Wilson, Note, Pharmaceutical Patent Protection: More Generic Favored Legislation May Cause
Pioneer Drug Companies To Pull the Plug on Innovation, 90 KY. L.J. 495, 510–11 (2002)
(“Although the 1984 Act was considered a compromise at the time it was passed, generic
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19

has seen explosive growth in the generic drug sector, which has led
to both significant savings for consumers and to significant profit
20
losses for innovative firms. Meanwhile, pharmaceutical patents are
challenged more often and earlier in their effective lives than they
21
were prior to the the Hatch-Waxman Act. Whether the current
patent system affords innovative firms with an adequate level of
protection, then, is highly debatable.
Patent protection has two dimensions: the time period during
which exclusive rights last and the scope of rights as defined by patent
claims. Effective patent protection requires a patent claim to be
22
construed more broadly than its literal language. The doctrine of
equivalents, created by judges to extend the coverage of a claim
beyond its literal scope, allows a patent holder to exclude from the
marketplace a competitive product that is either covered by the literal
meaning of the claim or that presents an equivalent of the claimed
23
invention. The Supreme Court’s opinion in Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu
24
Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., however, has significantly restricted
25
the reach of the doctrine through prosecution-history estoppel.
When the scope of a pharmaceutical patent claim is cut to its literal
companies appear to have gained more than they have lost—at the expense of pioneer
companies.”).
19. The generic market share has increased from 49 percent in 2000 to 78 percent in 2010.
PHARM. RESEARCH & MFRS. OF AM., supra note 10, at i. According to the Generic
Pharmaceutical Association, 10,072 of the 12,751 listed drugs in the FDA’s Approved Drug
Products with Theraputic Equivalence Evaluations, commonly known as the “Orange Book,”
have generic counterparts. Facts at a Glance, GENERIC PHARM. ASS’N, http://
www.gphaonline.org/about-gpha/about-generics/facts (last visited Jan. 16, 2013). The Orange
Book, available on the FDA’s website, provides a list of patents related to drug products
approved by the FDA. Orange Book: Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence
Evaluations, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/ob/
default.cfm (last updated Nov. 16, 2012). Additionally, the generic industry is estimated to grow
at an annual rate of more than 7.8 percent. Facts at a Glance, supra.
20. Henry G. Grabowski & Jeffrey L. Moe, Impact of Economic, Regulatory and Patent
Policies on Innovation in Cancer Chemoprevention, 1 CANCER PREVENTION RES. 84, 86 (2008)
(“For drugs with significant market sales at the time of patent expiration, the innovator’s brand
typically loses more than 90% of its market within a few months’ time . . . .”).
21. See infra Part I.B–C.
22. See Erin Conway, Note, The Aftermath of Festo v. SMC: Is There “Some Other
Reason” for Justifying the Third Festo Rebuttal Criterion?, 82 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1655, 1658
(2007) (“Because language is naturally ambiguous, and because a patentable invention is, by
definition, something that does not already exist in the art, there are times when language
cannot capture the essence of an invention.”).
23. See infra note 109 and accompanying text.
24. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722 (2002).
25. See infra notes 133–135 and accompanying text.

TANG IN FR (DO NOT DELETE)

1074

1/17/2013 4:43 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 62:1069

meaning, a generic manufacturer can make an insubstantial change to
the patented invention and then outcompete the brand-name drug
with the generic equivalent product. For example, a pharmaceutical
formulation claimed purely by the structure of its components can be
easily designed around by replacing one component with another that
26
serves the same function but that has a slightly different structure.
Therefore, a patent without adequate scope cannot help the
innovative firms recover their R&D investment, and this problem
cannot be solved by a longer patent term.
27
In 1952, Congress enacted the new Patent Act (1952 Act),
28
which for the first time provided a statutory basis for MPF claims.
Unlike a purely structural claim, in which every element of an
invention is defined by its structure, an MPF claim defines at least
29
one element of the claimed invention by its function. MPF claims
can therefore be relatively difficult for generic manufacturers to
design around, even with restricted application of the doctrine of
equivalents. As in the example above, if one component of the
claimed pharmaceutical formulation is defined by its function, a
competitor cannot design around the claim by replacing it with a
30
component that differs in structure but serves the same function.
Despite their statutory authorization, MPF claims remain largely
unexplored in the pharmaceutical industry. Broader use of MPF
claims would provide a more appropriate level of patent protection
for pharmaceutical inventors, which in turn could translate into
stronger economic incentives for investment. Because the application
of MPF claims in other technology areas has encountered some
31
conceptual and logical difficulties, this Note also examines related

26. MARTIN A. VOET, THE GENERIC CHALLENGE: UNDERSTANDING PATENTS, FDA
PHARMACEUTICAL LIFE-CYCLE MANAGEMENT 29 (3d ed. 2011); see also, e.g., Astra
Aktiebolag v. Andrx Pharm., Inc., 222 F. Supp. 2d 423, 510–11 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (holding that the
generic microtablet did not infringe claim 11 of the of the Prilosec patent because the generic
manufacturer designed around the claim by developing a formulation that did not require an
alkaline reacting compound in its core).
27. Patent Act, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 792 (1952) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C.).
28. Id. § 112, 66 Stat. at 798 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006)), amended by
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 4(c), 125 Stat. 284, 296 (2011); see also
infra notes 165–167 and accompanying text.
29. See infra Part III.
30. See infra Part III.B.
31. For a general discussion of the issues encountered when MPF claims are applied in
other technology areas, see Charles W. Bradley, Means-Plus-Function Clauses in Patent Claims:
A Tortuous Path, 33 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 1 (2006); and John F. Triggs,

AND
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issues that can be expected to accompany the application of MPF
clauses in pharmaceutical patents.
Part I analyzes the influence of the Hatch-Waxman Act, finding
that despite its dual purposes—to stimulate innovation and spur
generic development—it has primarily favored generic manufacturers
and increased innovative firms’ reliance on patent protection. Part II
discusses the issue of adequate claim scope for pharmaceutical
patents, focusing on the consequences of the restriction on the
doctrine of equivalents. It finds that the current system does not
properly protect innovative firms from challenges encouraged by the
Hatch-Waxman Act. Part III argues that MPF claims should be used
more frequently in pharmaceutical patents, which could provide
innovative firms with a more appropriate level of protection than that
which already exists.
I. THE HATCH-WAXMAN ACT AND THE RESULTING INCREASED
NEED FOR ADEQUATE PATENT PROTECTION
In 1984, Congress enacted the Hatch-Waxman Act to achieve
two conflicting, yet related, policy objectives: ensuring timely,
affordable public access to drugs and encouraging new product
32
development. Although intended to benefit both innovative firms
and generic manufacturers, the Hatch-Waxman Act has mainly
benefitted generic manufacturers by accelerating the market entry of
generic drugs. Additionally, the Hatch-Waxman Act has resulted in
heavily restricted trade-secret protection for innovative firms in the
United States, leading these firms to depend almost exclusively on the
patent system to profit. This Part briefly reviews the history and
relevant provisions of the Hatch-Waxman Act and discusses how it
has influenced pharmaceutical innovation.
A. History and Background of the Hatch-Waxman Act
1. Prior Drug Regulation. The Hatch-Waxman Act tried to solve
problems following two earlier regulations of drugs—the Food, Drug,
33
and Cosmetic Act of 1938 (FDCA) and the 1962 Kefauver-Harris
Functional Claiming: § 112 ¶ 6 Still Difficult After All These Years, LANDSLIDE, Jan.–Feb. 2011,
at 31.
32. Colleen Kelly, Note, The Balance Between Innovation and Competition: The HatchWaxman Act, the 2003 Amendments, and Beyond, 66 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 417, 417 (2011).
33. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, ch. 653, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (codified as
amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–399d (2006 & Supp. V 2012)).
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34

Amendment (1962 Amendment). The FDCA was the first federal
35
law to require testing to ensure drug safety. Pursuant to the FDCA,
pharmaceutical manufacturers must submit to the FDA a New Drug
Application (NDA), which includes safety-testing results. The FDCA
also imbued the FDA with the authority to prohibit the marketing of
36
drugs that it deemed unsafe or that lacked sufficient safety data.
Later, Congress enacted the 1962 Amendment, which changed the
NDA from a premarket notification process into an affirmative
37
approval system. Under the new system, drug manufacturers are
required to submit data demonstrating both safety and efficacy for
every new drug and are prohibited from using the new drug in the
38
marketplace until obtaining affirmative approval from the FDA.
2. Issues with Patent Terms. Following the 1962 Amendment,
patent-term adjustment became a highly debated issue. Innovative
firms felt that the new law had shortened the effective patent term for
new drugs, whereas generic manufacturers felt the patent terms were
39
improperly extended. Innovative manufacturers also raised concerns
about the reduced incentives for R&D investment in new drug
products because the heightened regulatory standard resulted in a
40
lengthened approval process. For innovative firms, which are usually
forced to file patent applications immediately after the discovery of a
41
potential drug candidate, the longer approval process meant shorter
34. Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).
35. Michelle Meadows, Promoting Safe and Effective Drugs for 100 Years, FDA
CONSUMER, Jan.–Feb. 2006, at 14, 17.
36. Patricia I. Carter, Federal Regulation of Pharmaceuticals in the United States and
Canada, 21 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 215, 218–19 (1999).
37. Drug Amendments of 1962, § 104(a), 76 Stat. at 784 (codified as amended at 21
U.S.C. § 355(a)).
38. Kelly, supra note 32, at 420.
39. See Gidcumb, supra note 3, at 32–33 (“[P]atent holders felt that they lost effective
patent term time and significant amounts of potential profit because of the delay in gaining
FDA approval. . . [Generic manufactures found there to be] a ‘de facto extension to the patent
term.’” (quoting Edward V. Filardi, Patent Issues That Both Regulatory Affairs Personnel and
Patent Attorneys Should Understand, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 215, 215 (1999))).
40. Between 1958 and 1979, the number of new FDA-approved products fell by 81 percent.
Matthew Hinsch, Hoecsht-Roussel Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Lehman, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
163, 163–64 (1998). The decline was largely attributed to the heightened standard of the FDAapproval process. Id. at 164.
41. Inadvertent disclosure can make an otherwise-patentable invention fail the “novelty”
requirement of patentability. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006), amended by Leahy-Smith America Invents
Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 3(b)(1), (n), 125 Stat. 284, 285, 293 (2011). This condition will still be
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effective patent terms because the clock for a patent term might start
running years before the patented drug product was approved for
42
marketing. As a result, the heightened regulatory standard without a
corresponding patent-term adjustment caused significant economic
43
loss for innovative firms.
While innovative firms clamored for a restoration of the effective
patent term lost during the regulatory review processes as a result of
the 1962 Amendment, generic manufacturers also lobbied for a
change in patent law to allow earlier market entry for their products.
44
In Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co., the Federal
Circuit held that a generic competitor’s use of a patented ingredient
to perform tests for the purpose of obtaining FDA approval of its
45
product infringed the patent. Accordingly, generic manufacturers
could not begin to test their versions of brand-name drugs until
related patents had expired, which, the generic manufacturers argued,
46
amounted to a de facto extension to the patent term.
B. Relevant Provisions in the Hatch-Waxman Act
The Hatch-Waxman Act amended patent law to address patentterm adjustment. It also provided a new drug regulatory scheme that
superseded all prior FDA policies and procedures governing the
47
marketing and approval of generic drugs. Among other things, the
new scheme established a certification process for generic
manufacturers to challenge drug patents, which has since resulted in

true under the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (America Invents Act), Pub. L. No. 112-29,
125 Stat. 284 (2011), when its first-inventor-to-file provisions become effective on March 16,
2013, id. § 3(n)(1), 125 Stat. at 293.
42. For example, if a new drug was patented three years before it was approved for
marketing, the innovative firm lost the three years during which it derived no economic benefit.
43. Susan E. Kopp, The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984:
Is It a Healthy Long Term Solution?, 71 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 945, 971 (1989)
(“The three years [needed to obtain FDA approval after NDA submission], combined with the
average of seven to ten years of research expended to produce the drug, is far too great an
investment of time and resources to be economically feasible . . . .”).
44. Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984), superseded by
Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, § 202, 98
Stat. 1585, 1603 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 271(e) (2006 & Supp. IV 2011)).
45. Id. at 863 (“We cannot . . . allow a violation of the patent laws in the guise of ‘scientific
inquiry,’ when that inquiry has definite, cognizable, and not insubstantial commercial
purposes.”).
46. Gidcumb, supra note 3, at 33.
47. Kelly, supra note 32, at 420.
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controversial litigation and developed into a major form of generic
48
competition against innovative firms.
1. Changes in Patent Law: Patent-Term Adjustment and the
Testing Exception for Generic Manufacturers. The Hatch-Waxman
Act addressed concerns from both innovative firms and generic
manufacturers with respect to effective patent terms. First, it includes
a patent-term restoration provision to remedy the loss in effective
49
terms for drug patents caused by the lengthy regulatory processes.
The statute provides that the term of an eligible drug patent “shall be
extended by the time equal to the regulatory review period for the
approved product which period occurs after the date the patent is
50
51
issued.” The restoration is subject to limitations.
Second, the Hatch-Waxman Act overrules Bolar, permitting
generic manufacturers to use patented brand-name drugs before
patent expiration for activities “reasonably related” to the purpose of
52
seeking FDA approval of their drugs. With this provision, generic
manufacturers can start the regulatory-review process for their
products before relevant patents expire, which greatly accelerates the
market entry of generic drugs.
2. The New Scheme of Generic-Drug Regulation. The HatchWaxman Act also revised the FDCA to streamline the regulatoryapproval process for generic drugs by extending the use of the

48. See infra Part I.B.3.
49. This provision was passed under Title II of the Hatch-Waxman Act and codified at 35
U.S.C. § 156 (2006), as amended by Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 37,
125 Stat. 284, 341 (2011).
50. 35 U.S.C. § 156(c).
51. First, the maximum patent-term extension cannot exceed five years; second, the total
patent term plus any restoration extension cannot exceed fourteen years from the date of FDA
approval; third, the period that can be restored will be reduced by any period during which the
applicant did not act with due diligence. Id. § 156(c)(1), (c)(3), (g)(6)(a). Some scholars view the
fourteen-year limit as inadequate because many nondrug patents get a seventeen-year useful
term. See, e.g., Sherry M. Knowles, Fixing the Legal Framework for Pharmaceutical Research,
327 SCIENCE 1083, 1083 (2010) (“This creates the situation where a relatively unregulated,
simple, inexpensive invention may receive 17 years or more of useful patent term, whereas more
expensive and important pharmaceutical innovations get useful patent terms capped at 14
years . . . .”).
52. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (“It shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, offer to sell,
or sell . . . a patented invention . . . solely for uses reasonably related to the development and
submission of information under a Federal law . . . .”).
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53

Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA). As a result, generic
manufacturers can have their products more quickly and
inexpensively approved for marketing. Under the new regulation,
ANDA filers only need to submit data to show that their products are
54
“bioequivalent[s]” of the brand-name drugs to gain FDA approval.
This process costs much less than a full NDA, which requires
independent research and separate clinical data to prove the safety
55
and efficacy of the drug products.
The Hatch-Waxman Act further facilitates ANDA filing by
putting a statutory limit on data exclusivity for brand-name drugs.
Prior to the Hatch-Waxman Act, the safety and efficacy data of drugs
were treated as trade secrets, which were not accessible to other drug
56
manufacturers or the public at large. Under the new regulatory
scheme, the safety and efficacy data of brand-name drugs enjoy only a
57
limited time of exclusivity. After the exclusivity period ends, generic
companies can use the data to seek regulatory approval for their
58
products in ANDA filings. The Hatch-Waxman Act provides that
the term of data exclusivity is limited to five years for drug products
59
containing a New Chemical Entity (NCE). For non-NCE drug
60
61
products, data exclusivity is limited to three years. Moreover,
53. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2006 & Supp. V 2012). Before 1984, generic manufacturers could
only use an ANDA for pre-1962 brand-name drugs that the FDA had deemed safe and effective
under its Drug Efficacy Study Implementation program. Kelly, supra note 32, at 420. The
Hatch-Waxman Act expanded the ANDA process to all post-1962 brand-name drugs. Id. at 421.
54. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(iv) (2006). “Bioequivalent” is defined in § 355(j)(8)(B).
55. Kelly, supra note 32, at 423. Additionally, generic companies can also choose to file a
paper NDA, also known as a section 505(b)(2) NDA under the FDCA. Id. at 423 & n.62; see
also 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(2) (specifying the requirements for “[a]n application submitted . . . for a
drug for which the investigations described [earlier in the section] and relied upon by the
applicant for approval of the application were not conducted by or for the applicant”). A paper
NDA is similar to a full NDA except that in a paper NDA, generic manufacturers can use
published scientific data to demonstrate the safety and efficacy of their drugs. Id. at 423 n.62.
56. Bruce N. Kuhlik, The Assault on Pharmaceutical Intellectual Property, 71 U. CHI. L.
REV. 93, 97–98 (2004).
57. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(F)(i)–(iv).
58. Id.
59. Id. § 355(j)(5)(F)(ii). A “[n]ew chemical entity” is a drug that contains no “active
moiety” that has been approved in another NDA. New Drug Product Exclusivity, 21
C.F.R. § 314.108(a) (2012). An “active moiety” is “the molecule or ion, excluding those
appended portions of the molecule that cause the drug to be an ester, salt . . . or other
noncovalent derivative . . . , responsible for the physiological or pharmacological action of the
drug substance.” Id.
60. These products include new formulations or salts, new indications, new dosage forms,
new dosage strengths, new routes of administration, or new combinations of previously
approved drugs.

TANG IN FR (DO NOT DELETE)

1080

1/17/2013 4:43 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 62:1069

although the FDA cannot issue an approval for an equivalent generic
product before the data-exclusivity period on the branded product
expires, a generic company can file an ANDA for its version of a nonNCE product during the three-year period, anticipating an immediate
62
approval at the end of the exclusivity period.
3. Paragraph IV Challenges: The Intersection of Patent Law and
Drug Law. The ANDA process includes a mechanism by which the
branded companies and generic manufacturers can resolve any patent
disputes. The Hatch-Waxman Act requires branded companies to
63
provide the FDA with a list of patents related to their drug products
64
and requires the FDA to make the lists publicly available in its
Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations,
65
commonly known as the “Orange Book.” As part of the ANDA
process, generic manufacturers are required to file a certification for
each Orange Book patent listed under the drug that they intend to
offer as a generic, stating: (1) the patent information has not been
filed with the FDA, (2) the patent has expired, (3) the generic will not
enter the market prior to the date on which the patent expires, or (4)
the patent is invalid, unenforceable, and/or not infringed on by the
66
new drug for which the application is submitted. The fourth
67
assertion is referred to as a “Paragraph IV certification.”
The Hatch-Waxman Act treats the ANDA, filed together with a
Paragraph IV certification, as a technical act of patent infringement—
68
otherwise known as a PIV challenge. Thus, the innovative firms and
generic manufacturers can resolve their patent dispute before the
generic drug reaches the market. The innovative firm is promptly
notified after an ANDA is filed with a Paragraph IV certification

61. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(F)(iii)–(iv).
62. See id. (setting the date by which the FDA may “make the approval of an
application . . . effective”).
63. See id. § 355(b)(1)(G) (“The applicant shall file with the application the patent number
and the expiration date of any patent which claims the drug . . . or which claims a method of
using such drug . . . .”).
64. Id. § 355(j)(7).
65. See Orange Book: Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations,
supra note 19.
66. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(i)–(vii).
67. E.g., Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 482 F.3d 1330, 1334 (Fed. Cir.
2007); Apotex, Inc. v. Thompson, 347 F.3d 1335, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
68. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2) (Supp. IV 2011).
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against its product. Upon receiving the notice, the innovative firm
has forty-five days to file a patent-infringement action against the
generic competitor, the ANDA applicant. This action keeps the FDA
from approving the ANDA until either the generic company
70
successfully defends the case in court or for thirty months. If,
however, the innovator decides not to initiate an infringement action,
71
the FDA can immediately approve the ANDA. To encourage
ANDA filing, the Hatch-Waxman Act grants 180 days of market
exclusivity to the first filer that succeeds in the PIV challenge,
meaning that no other generic manufacturer can enter the market
72
during this time with a competing equivalent product.
C. Influence on the Pharmaceutical Industry
The Hatch-Waxman Act has substantially shaped the
pharmaceutical industry. Most significantly, the Hatch-Waxman Act
has greatly emboldened generic competition against innovative firms
73
in the form of a growing number of PIV challenges. Although the
Hatch-Waxman Act was designed partly to restore patent terms for
innovators corresponding to the time lost during regulatory review, it
74
is debatable whether this benefit has actually materialized. As a
result, innovative firms live in a relatively hostile environment
wherein available patent protection is constantly vulnerable to
challenges—often at the earliest possible moment—and trade-secret
protection previously accorded indefinitely to safety and efficacy data
75
is limited to a maximum of five years. This underprotection of
intellectual property rights is at least partly responsible for the
financial problems faced by branded firms and the stifled
pharmaceutical innovation—reflected by the drying up of new76
product pipelines in pharmaceutical companies.

69. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(B) (2006).
70. Id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii).
71. Id.
72. Id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv).
73. See Hemphill & Sampat, supra note 4, at 614 (“[T]he prevalence of [PIV] challenges
has risen dramatically over the past 25 years . . . .”).
74. In February 1988, forty extensions were granted to drug patents with an average of 1.8
years. Miller, supra note 18, at 107. Yet the average period of review for these drugs averaged
8.2 years. Id.
75. See supra Part I.B.2; infra Part I.C.3.
76. See Higgins & Graham, supra note 4, at 370 (“[O]ne particular U.S. regulation—the
Paragraph IV patent challenge—is increasingly stifling new drug innovation . . . .”).
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1. The Burgeoning of PIV Challenges. The sharp increase in PIV
challenges began after a Federal Circuit case decided in 2000, Eli
77
Lilly & Co. v. Barr Laboratories, Inc. In Eli Lilly, the generic
company Barr Laboratories won a PIV challenge by invalidating one
claim in the patent on the drug fluoxetine, known commercially as
78
Prozac. After Eli Lilly, both the number of generic companies that
are active in PIV filing and the number of products being challenged
79
have rapidly increased. The number of lawsuits filed involving PIV
challenges has gone up from thirty-five in 2001 to 242 in 2011, a more
80
than sixfold increase. As of November 2012, 243 products are under
PIV challenges, and many are attacked by multiple generic
81
manufacturers.
This proliferation of PIV challenges is a direct result of the
Hatch-Waxman Act. In addition to the much cheaper ANDA
procedure, the 180-day market-exclusivity period also serves as a
strong economic incentive for generic manufacturers to file an
82
ANDA. Without competition, the successful generic challenger can
price their products at a level close to that of the innovator, reaping
significant economic gain.
As estimated by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), the
average revenue generated by a successful PIV challenge is $60
83
million, whereas the average cost of a challenge is about $5 million.
A generic company, then, only needs to win one in every twelve
challenges to make a profit. In reality, generic companies have done
much better than that. As provided by the FTC study, from 1992 to
2000, 72 percent of PIV challenges filed led to litigation, and generic
84
companies won 42 percent of the cases. The great economic return
77. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 251 F.3d 955 (Fed. Cir. 2000); see also Gregory Glass,
Pharmaceutical Patent Challenges—Time for Reassessment?, 3 NATURE REVS.: DRUG
DISCOVERY 1057, 1057 (2004) (“In the period from 1984 to 2000, only a few generics companies
were equipped and willing to withstand the expenses of product development and ensuing legal
battles. Starting in 2000, after Barr Labs successfully challenged the Lilly blockbuster fluoxetine
(Prozac), these generics companies started to incorporate Paragraph IV patent challenges as
part of their core business strategies.”).
78. Eli Lilly & Co., 251 F.3d at 958–59.
79. Glass, supra note 77, at 1058.
80. Data are available at a subscription-based website. THE PARAGRAPH FOUR REPORT,
http://www.paragraphfour.com (last visited Jan. 16, 2013).
81. Id.
82. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (2006).
83. Higgins & Graham, supra note 4, at 370.
84. Id. More recent data can be found in THE PARAGRAPH FOUR REPORT, supra note 80.
Of the 320 PIV cases decided in U.S. district courts in recent years, the innovative firms won
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from PIV challenges has led to the popularity of “prospecting” among
generic companies—a business strategy whereby generic companies
file a wide range of PIV challenges in the hope of winning a small
85
fraction of those challenges. Because patent litigation can easily cost
millions of dollars, meritless PIV challenges have resulted in
increased transaction costs to the patent system, which is especially
problematic for start-ups and small innovative companies that lack
the resources for litigation.
2. Early Patent Challenges. In addition to providing financial
rewards, the Hatch-Waxman Act has enabled generic companies to
file PIV challenges at an early stage of the patent term after the
86
relevant regulatory exclusivity has expired. By overruling Bolar, the
Hatch-Waxman Act allows a generic manufacturer to use a patented
87
product to conduct bioequivalency studies for the ANDA process.
After gathering sufficient data, the generic manufacturer can decide
to push for market entry before the patent expires by filing a PIV
challenge, alleging that the patent is invalid, unenforceable, not
infringed by its product, or a combination thereof.
88
Because the regulatory review process for an ANDA is short,
the generic manufacturer can potentially enter the market long
before the full statutory term of the patent expires. Even if it loses the
PIV challenge, it can still market its drug immediately after the patent
89
expires, years earlier than what was possible before 1984.
3. Loss of Trade-Secret Protection for Innovative Firms.
Moreover, the data-exclusivity provisions of the Hatch-Waxman Act
have significantly reduced trade-secret protection for innovative
only 95 (29.7 percent), whereas generic companies won 68 (21.3 percent), and 157 cases (49.1
percent) went to settlement. Id. The data were last updated in November 2012 and include the
outcomes from all cases pending as of November 1, 2003. Id.
85. Hemphill & Sampat, supra note 4, at 614–15.
86. See C. Scott Hemphill & Bhaven N. Sampat, Evergreening, Patent Challenges, and
Effective Market Life in Pharmaceuticals, 31 J. HEALTH ECON. 327, 327 (2012) (demonstrating
“a sharp[] increase for early [PIV] challenges” between 2001 and 2010).
87. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
88. A generic company meeting the statutory requirements can file an ANDA and receive
a response from the FDA within 150 days. 21 U.S.C. § 355(q)(1)(F) (Supp. V 2012), as amended
by Food and Drug Administration Safety and Innovation Act, Pub. L. No. 112-144, § 1135, 126
Stat. 993, 1135 (2012).
89. See Wilson, supra note 18, at 510 (“With the benefits of shortened FDA approval
[under the Hatch-Waxman Act] . . . , a generic drug has the ability to be on the market almost
immediately after a pioneer patent expires.”).
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firms. Hatch-Waxman’s mandatory data disclosure meant loss of
trade secrets, a hitherto significant barrier that protected innovative
firms from generic competition. Generic manufacturers previously
might not have been able to sell a particular drug on the market
because they lacked the resources to obtain the safety and efficacy
data required to obtain regulatory approval. Under the HatchWaxman Act, however, generic manufacturers have access to the data
generated by the innovative firms after the data-exclusivity period
expires and thus must only generate bioequivalency data to gain
regulatory approval. Due to diminished trade-secret protection,
innovative firms have had to rely more heavily on the patent system
to protect their economic interests.
4. Reduced Patent Protection for Innovators. The rapid increase
of PIV challenges has led to reduced patent protection for innovators
because they lose market exclusivity if the relevant patents are found
to be invalid, unenforceable, or noninfringed by the generic product.
90
In reality, innovative firms are not only under attack, but they are
91
losing a significant number of these battles. Due to the prevalence of
PIV challenges, the average market life for brand-name drugs facing
a first generic entry between 2001 and 2010 is only twelve years
92
despite the nominal sixteen-year patent term. Studies have also
shown that the average market-exclusivity period has decreased
93
significantly since the mid-1990s. This decrease could reduce

90. As of November 2012, 132 branded companies have products that are under active PIV
challenge. THE PARAGRAPH FOUR REPORT, supra note 80.
91. See supra note 84 and accompanying text. Also note that the data shown here
underestimate the actual loss suffered by innovative firms because the fraction of ANDA filings
with PIV challenges that do not lead to litigation has not been taken into account. One
contributing factor for innovative firms to decide not to litigate is that they have only forty-five
days to file the lawsuit upon receiving the notice of ANDA filing. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3)(C)
(2006) (stating that approval of an application with a PIV certification will be effective
immediately unless the patent holder brings an infringement action within the forty-five-day
time frame). The innovative firms may also give up if they conclude that they will likely lose in
court anyway. But for the PIV challenges, litigation would be commenced much later in time, if
it occurred at all.
92. Hemphill & Sampat, supra note 86, at 336.
93. See Henry G. Grabowski & Margaret Kyle, Generic Competition and Market
Exclusivity Periods in Pharmaceuticals, 28 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 491, 497 (2007)
(reporting that the effective market life for the ten drugs has decreased from 13.8 years between
1995–2001 to 11.2 years between 2002–2005). But see Hemphill & Sampat, supra note 86, at 336
(concluding that the average effective market life for drug products did not change much
between the 1990s and 2000s). Even if the overall effective market life has not decreased, the
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anticipated profitability for potential drug products, making them less
attractive to investors. Indeed, some innovative firms would assert
that pervasive patent challenges pose a more severe problem than
94
patent expiration.
These observations compel one question: Why are innovative
firms losing so many PIV challenges? Or put differently, why do
pharmaceutical patents appear so weak when under attack? The
patent holders lose in two ways: first, the patent is found invalid,
unenforceable, or both; second, the claim is so narrow in scope that it
95
does not cover the alleged infringing product. As discussed in Part
II, patent claims tend to be narrowly construed due to judicially
restrictive application of the doctrine of equivalents. Consequently,
the actual protection afforded by many patents is slim in scope, which
at least partially explains the failure of innovative firms to cope with
the increase of PIV challenges. Although the problem of inadequate
patent scope is not a product of the Hatch-Waxman Act, it has
become particularly prevalent as the Hatch-Waxman Act has left
innovative firms increasingly reliant on the patent system.
In summary, after enactment of the Hatch-Waxman Act in 1984,
the prospecting strategy gained popularity among generic companies
and created serious problems for innovative firms. As discussed in
detail in Part II, these problems are further exacerbated by the
inadequate claim scope of pharmaceutical patents, as construed by
courts. These two factors combined have substantially contributed to
the decrease in R&D investments and the drying up of new product
pipelines in the pharmaceutical industry.
II. EFFECTIVE PATENT-CLAIM SCOPE: FESTO AND THE DOCTRINE
OF EQUIVALENTS
To protect themselves from fierce generic competition,
innovators rely heavily on the patent system. Restrictive application
of the doctrine of equivalents, however, has unduly narrowed the
claim scope of pharmaceutical patents and has significantly limited
the patent protection available for innovators. Patents can only

patent term is less secure, the risk to the firm is higher, and the cost of drug development is
increased due to litigation costs, all of which contribute to the loss of incentives for investors.
94. Glass, supra note 77, at 1057.
95. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV) (2006) (providing that a successful PIV challenge
requires a generic manufacturer to establish that “such patent is invalid or will not be infringed
by the manufacture, use, or sale of the new drug for which the application is submitted”).
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incentivize investment when they have the scope necessary to
effectively confer the benefit of market exclusivity and thus help the
innovators recoup their investments. If a patent claim has too narrow
of a scope, competitors can use information disclosed in the patent to
design around the slim-cut claim and develop an equivalent, yet
noninfringing, product. Because a patent with a narrow scope may be
96
worse than no patent at all in attracting investors, granting adequate
scope for patent claims is critical for the patent system to efficiently
encourage R&D investment.
As Judge Raymond Clevenger of the Federal Circuit has noted,
97
“[T]he name of the game is the claim.” Claims are the most critical
component of a patent because they mark the boundaries of an
98
99
invention. During prosecution, claims are intensely scrutinized by
examiners in the United States Patent and Trademark Office
100
(USPTO) to determine their patentability. During litigation, claim
construction is performed as a preliminary matter in a separate
101
hearing (also known as a Markman hearing) and often can be
102
dispositive in determining the outcome of the case. For a long time
in the U.S. patent system’s history, the doctrine of equivalents played

96. See Jean Burke Fordis & William L. Leschensky, Advanced Bio/Chemical Claim
Drafting Issues, in ADVANCED PATENT PROSECUTION WORKSHOP 2009: CLAIM DRAFTING &
AMENDMENT WRITING at 691, 738 (PLI Intellectual Prop., Course Handbook Series No. G-977,
2009) (“Claims that are drawn too narrowly give the invention away without adequate
protection, and may be worse than no patent at all, which at least offers the possibility of trade
secret protection and does not broadcast the invention to the world.”).
97. In re Hiniker Co., 150 F.3d 1362, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
98. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“It is a ‘bedrock
principle’ of patent law that ‘the claims of a patent define the invention to which the patentee is
entitled the right to exclude.’” (quoting Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys.,
Inc., 381 F.3d 1111, 1115 (Fed. Cir. 2004))).
99. Prosecution of a patent describes the process whereby applicants or their
representatives interact with an examiner at the United States Patent and Trademark Office
(USPTO) with regard to a pending application for a patent.
100. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1316 (“[T]he rules of the PTO require that application claims
must ‘conform to the invention . . . and the terms and phrases used in the claims must find clear
support or antecedent basis . . . .’” (quoting 37 C.F.R. § 1.75(d)(1))).
101. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 384 (1996) (“The
[construction of patent claims] is a question of law, to be determined by the court . . . .” (quoting
Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330, 338 (1854)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
102. John M. Benassi, Melinda Luthin & David W. Mulliken, Claim Construction and
Proving Infringement: Impact of Phillips and Festo and Their Progeny, in PATENT LITIGATION
2007, at 57, 65 (PLI Intellectual Prop., Course Handbook Series G-910, 2007) (“[A] claim term’s
construction is often dispositive in determining claim validity in light of prior art.”).
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103

a vital role in providing patents with adequate scope. This doctrine,
however, has been applied less consistently, even sparingly, in recent
decades. This Part reviews the history of this doctrine and discusses
how its restrictive application has affected pharmaceutical innovation,
especially in view of the growing number of PIV challenges.
A. The Doctrine of Equivalents
Since the 1850s, the Supreme Court has used the doctrine of
104
equivalents to provide adequate claim scope for patent holders. To
prove infringement, a patent holder must demonstrate that the
claimed invention covers the alleged product, which requires
105
construction of the terms in the claim. Generally, courts interpret
patent terms according to the “ordinary and customary meaning” of
106
the words used. But, due to the inherent ambiguity in and
limitations of language, a literal reading of the patent claims
107
sometimes cannot capture the essential scope of the invention.
Restricting the protection to the literal scope of claims could allow a
competitor to make insubstantial modifications and avoid
108
infringement.
The doctrine of equivalents broadens the claim’s scope beyond
its literal boundaries. Under this doctrine, “a product or process that
does not literally infringe upon the express terms of a patent claim
may nonetheless be found to infringe if there is ‘equivalence’ between
the elements of the accused product or process and the claimed
109
elements of the patented invention.” In other words, in situations in
which patent holders cannot prove literal infringement because the

103. See Conway, supra note 22, at 1659 (“[T]he Supreme Court in Winans v. Denmead[, 56
U.S. (15 How.) 330 (1854),] adopted the doctrine of equivalents in 1853 . . . .”).
104. Id.
105. See Markman, 517 U.S. at 374 (“Victory in an infringement suit requires a finding that
the patent claim ‘covers the alleged infringer’s product or process,’ which in turn necessitates a
determination of ‘what the words in the claim mean.’” (quoting HERBERT F. SCHWARTZ,
PATENT LAW AND PRACTICE 80 (2d ed. 1995))).
106. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“We have frequently
stated that the words of a claim ‘are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning.’”
(quoting Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996))).
107. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 731 (2002).
108. See id. (“If patents were always interpreted by their literal terms, their value would be
greatly diminished. Unimportant and insubstantial substitutes for certain elements could defeat
the patent, and its value to inventors could be destroyed by simple acts of copying.”).
109. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 21 (1997) (quoting
Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 609 (1950)).
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literal language of the claim does not cover the accused product, they
can still prove infringement under the doctrine of equivalents by
showing that the accused product is an equivalent of the claimed
invention. To determine whether the alleged infringing product or
process is an equivalent of the claimed invention, courts have
developed a “function-way-result” test, which provides that
equivalency will be found when “two devices do the same work in
substantially the same way, and accomplish substantially the same
110
result.”
B. Prosecution-History Estoppel Under Festo
Application of the doctrine of equivalents is subject to a number
of limitations, the most significant of which is prosecution-history
111
estoppel. Prosecution-history estoppel prevents patent holders from
using the doctrine of equivalents to prove infringement if they have
surrendered the subject matter at issue during prosecution
112
proceedings. In other words, if the subject matter is excluded from a
claim by a narrowing amendment to comply with a patentability
requirement, patent holders cannot reclaim it under the doctrine of
equivalents during litigation. Thus, estoppel often provides a
powerful check on the application of the doctrine of equivalents in
the pharmaceutical industry, especially after the Festo decision.
In Festo, the Supreme Court reexamined the interaction between
prosecution-history estoppel and the doctrine of equivalents and
113
provided new guidelines for their application. Whether intended by
the Court or not, the decision created a powerful estoppel that has
resulted in a much more limited version of the doctrine of

110. Mach. Co. v. Murphy, 97 U.S. 120, 125 (1878). Courts have also examined the issue of
equivalency by asking (1) whether there are only “insubstantial differences” between the
accused device and claimed invention, Dawn Equip. Co. v. Ky. Farms Inc., 140 F.3d 1009, 1015
(Fed. Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks omitted); or (2) whether the claimed limitation is
interchangeable with the corresponding elements in the accused device, Perkin-Elmer Corp. v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 822 F.2d 1528, 1535 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
111. Benassi et al., supra note 102, at 93–94. Other limitations on the doctrine of equivalents
include the all-element rule, the public-dedication rule, and prior art. Id. at 93. Briefly, the allelement rule states that the doctrine applies to each discrete element of the claim rather than to
the whole invention. Id. at 94. The public-dedication rule provides that the doctrine cannot be
used to recapture unclaimed subject matter that has already been disclosed to the public in the
patent application. Id. Finally, the scope of a patent cannot be extended to cover prior art. Id.
112. Pharmacia & Upjohn Co. v. Mylan Pharm., Inc., 170 F.3d 1373, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
113. Festo, 535 U.S. at 736, 740.
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114

equivalents. In short, the Court revisited the policy justifications for
both doctrines and relied on its precedents to hold the following:
115
First, a narrowing amendment made to satisfy any patentability
116
requirement may give rise to estoppel. Second, estoppel establishes
a presumption of a complete bar for invoking the doctrine of
equivalents unless the patent holder carries the burden to show that
the amendment does not surrender the particular equivalent in
117
question.
The first holding greatly expands the reach of prosecutionhistory estoppel. Before a patent can be issued, it must satisfy a set of
statutory requirements both with respect to its substance and to its
formality. The claimed subject matter must be useful, novel, and
118
nonobvious, and the patent application must describe and enable
119
the embodiment of the invention. In prior cases, prosecution-history
estoppel had only been applied “where claims have been amended for
a limited set of reasons [related to subject matter], such as to avoid
prior art, or otherwise to address a specific concern—such as
120
obviousness.” In Festo, the Court explicitly rejected this substancebased categorical limitation on the application of estoppel, reasoning
that any amendment, if not “truly cosmetic,” would narrow the
121
patent-claim scope and raise the estoppel issue.
Regarding the effect of establishing estoppel, the Court framed
the question as, “Does the estoppel bar the inventor from asserting
infringement against any equivalent to the narrowed element or

114. See infra notes 133–135 and accompanying text.
115. An amendment is the procedure by which the patent applicant, while prosecuting a
patent from the USPTO, makes changes to the initially submitted patent claims to satisfy
patentability requirements. The amendments can be either substantive or formalistic and can
either broaden or narrow the scope of the claim.
116. Festo, 535 U.S. at 736.
117. Id. at 740.
118. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–103 (2006), as amended by Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L.
No. 112-29, § 3(b)(1), (c), (n), 125 Stat. 284, 285, 287, 293 (2011).
119. Id. § 112(a) (2006), as amended by Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, § 4(c), 125 Stat.
at 296.
120. Festo, 535 U.S. at 735 (quoting Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520
U.S. 17, 30–32 (1997)).
121. Id. at 736–37. According to the Court, a patent holder who has amended “a claim as a
condition for obtaining a patent disavows his claim to the broader subject matter, whether the
amendment was made to avoid the prior art [to satisfy the subject matter requirement,] or to
comply with § 112 [to satisfy the formality requirement].” Id. at 737.
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might some equivalents still infringe?” With the holding of the
“presumption” rule, estoppel establishes a presumption of a complete
bar for asserting equivalents. This presumption is only rebuttable
when the patent holder proves that
[t]he equivalent may have been unforeseeable at the time of the
application; the rationale underlying the amendment may bear no
more than a tangential relation to the equivalent in question; or there
may be some other reason suggesting that the patentee could not
reasonably be expected to have described the insubstantial
123
substitute in question.

In reaching these holdings, the Supreme Court emphasized the
124
“notice” goal of patent law. Patent law requires that inventors
describe their inventions in “full, clear, concise, and exact terms” to
125
receive the benefit of patent protection. This requirement seeks to
make boundaries of patent claims as clear as possible to promote
126
efficient investment in innovation. Without knowing with some
certainty where a patent’s exclusionary rights end, competitors might
be deterred from manufacturing legitimate products that are outside
127
of the scope of the patent. They might also accidentally invest in
products that are secured by a patent, resulting in inefficient
128
allocation of resources and wasteful litigation.
The doctrine of equivalents, while serving the critical role of
ensuring fair value for patents, simultaneously makes the scope of
patents uncertain because of the difficulty in anticipating the entire
breadth of equivalents. To alleviate this uncertainty, prosecutionhistory estoppel provides that the prosecution proceedings in the
USPTO should be examined to determine the proper scope of

122. Id. at 740–41 (emphasis added). The Court of Appeals adopted a “complete bar” rule,
which would disallow any assertion of equivalent and reduce the claim scope to its “strict literal
terms.” Id. at 737. The Supreme Court deemed this per se rule to be unprecedented, id., and
found that it might have jeopardized the “balances the PTO sought to strike when issuing the
numerous patents which have not yet expired and which would be affected by our decision,” id.
at 739.
123. Id. at 740–41 (emphasis added).
124. Id. at 739.
125. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006), as amended by Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No.
112-29, § 4(c), 125 Stat. 284, 296 (2011). This particular requirement does not change after the
America Invents Act.
126. Festo, 535 U.S. at 730–31.
127. Id. at 732.
128. Id.
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equivalents for any element of a claim. An applicant who has
narrowed a claim element to overcome a rejection during prosecution
is thus prohibited from arguing in subsequent litigation that the
surrendered subject matter should be deemed as equivalent to the
130
literal claims of the issued patents. Therefore, prosecution-history
estoppel provides checks on the reach of the doctrine of equivalents
and ensures that its application “remains tied to its underlying
131
purpose.”
Festo first appeared to be a victory for patent holders because
they were granted the opportunity to rebut the presumption of a
complete bar to the doctrine of equivalents when estoppel is in
132
133
effect. Due to the practical difficulty in rebutting the presumption
and the strict rule that any narrowing amendment, substantive or not,
creates a presumption of estoppel, Festo actually resulted in an
estoppel doctrine so powerful that it has practically eliminated the
134
doctrine of equivalents. In fact, in light of this ruling and subsequent
cases, some practitioners have suggested that “it appears likely that
only those patents that make it through the PTO unamended will
135
enjoy the previous scope of the doctrine of equivalents.”
C. Effects of Festo on PIV Challenges: A Hypothetical
As discussed in Part I, the increasing use of PIV challenges by
generic manufacturers following the enactment of the Hatch-Waxman
Act has become a major threat to innovative pharmaceutical
companies, as they face constant challenges to their patents and
actually lose many of those battles. One important factor that
contributes to their losses is the restrictive application of the doctrine
of equivalents under Festo, which makes it much easier for the
generic manufacturers to design around the patent.
There are three major types of pharmaceutical patents: drugsubstance patents, which claim the active ingredients of drugs (also
known as AI patents); drug-product patents, which claim either
129. Id. at 733.
130. Id. at 733–34.
131. Id. at 734–35.
132. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
133. See Benassi et al., supra note 102, at 66 (“[F]or patentees, this rebuttal opportunity
turned out to be more hype than hope . . . because of practical obstacles to producing
compelling evidence that will suffice to rebut the presumption.”).
134. Triggs, supra note 31, at 31.
135. Benassi et al., supra note 102, at 67.

TANG IN FR (DO NOT DELETE)

1092

1/17/2013 4:43 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 62:1069

particular drug formulations or compositions; and finally, method-ofuse patents, which claim various therapeutic indications of a specific
136
drug. This Section uses a drug-product patent claim as an example
to illustrate how the restricted application of the doctrine of
equivalents under Festo fails to provide appropriate protection for
innovators.
Assume that an innovative firm (Innovator) has spent millions of
dollars to develop a new formulation of its drug X. The patent of the
formulation is listed as drug X in the Orange Book, and a generic
manufacturer (Generic) files a PIV challenge alleging that its own
version of drug X, X1, does not infringe Innovator’s patent. A drug
formulation often contains active ingredients plus an inert carrier,
which usually helps optimize the effect of the drug through a variety
137
of mechanisms. Here, assume that X comprises three elements: two
active ingredients, A and B, plus a specific carrier C, which improves
A’s absorption by the human body. The active ingredients A and B
are critical to the drug’s efficacy and safety and cannot be easily
138
replaced. There may be a number of potential substituents for
carrier C that, much like carrier C, improve A’s absorption through
the same mechanism. These substituents usually can be easily
identified according to the specific mechanism of C as revealed in the
patent. Here, assume that Generic has identified carrier C1 as a
replacement of C and developed X1 that comprises A, B, and C1. All
Generic needs to do to gain FDA approval for X1 is to demonstrate
that X1 is a bioequivalent to X, which should be relatively easy.
When Generic files the ANDA for drug X1, Innovator will
receive a notice and have forty-five days to file a lawsuit to allege
infringement. If Innovator fails to do so, X1 will be considered
noninfringing and can enter the market as soon as the regulatory
exclusivity period for X ends and the ANDA is approved. Because X
139
is a new formula, which is a non-NCE drug product, it only enjoys
three years of data exclusivity and the ANDA for X1 can be

136. Submission of Patent Information, 21 C.F.R. § 314.53 (2012).
137. See U.S. FDA Drug Definitions, REGISTRAR CORP, http://www.registrarcorp.com/fdaguidance/fda-definitions/drugs.jsp (last visited Jan. 16, 2012) (defining pharmaceutical
formulation as “the process in which different chemical substances, including the active drug,
are combined to produce a final medicinal product”).
138. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(ii) (2006) (providing that generic manufacturers will not
be able to get ANDA approval if they change the active ingredients), as amended by Food and
Drug Administration Safety and Innovation Act, Pub. L. No. 112-144, 126 Stat. 993 (2012).
139. See supra notes 59–60 and accompanying text.
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approved immediately after the three-year period expires.
If
Innovator, however, chooses to litigate and succeeds in the litigation,
141
it will enjoy the full twenty-year term of patent protection, several
times longer than the data-exclusivity period. Thus, the difference in
potential economic return for Innovator between the two scenarios is
quite substantial.
Assuming that Innovator has timely initiated the lawsuit, what
would be the likely outcome? Because drug X1 does not use C as its
carrier, the literal scope of the patent does not cover X1, and
Innovator’s only hope is to win under the doctrine of equivalents.
Under Festo, the threshold issue is whether the carrier claim element
142
has been narrowed to satisfy the patentability requirement.
Assuming, as is often the case, that the element was amended to C
143
from a broader recitation encompassing C, the Festo ruling applies
and the carrier element is limited to its literal scope—C but not C’s
equivalents. Consequently, unless Innovator establishes one of the
144
three exceptions to the Festo presumption, which is difficult to do,
estoppel will apply and Generic will likely win on noninfringement,
causing Innovator to lose most of its market for X a few months after
145
the three-year exclusivity period ends.
The scenario described above is not unusual in today’s
pharmaceutical industry, and it can at least partially explain why
146
innovative firms are losing so many patent battles. One might argue,
however, that this example only represents non-AI patents, which are
by nature less novel or innovative than AI patents. As a matter of
fact, an empirical study published in 2011 found that generic

140. See supra notes 60–62 and accompanying text.
141. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2006) (providing for twenty-year terms), as amended by
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, §§ 3(j), 20(j)(1), 125 Stat. 284, 290, 335
(2011).
142. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
143. This is especially likely to happen if the patent was issued before the Festo ruling
because Festo strongly discourages narrowing amendments. See supra notes 134–135 and
accompanying text.
144. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
145. See Grabowski & Kyle, supra note 93, at 492 (2007) (observing that generics enter the
market “usually within a few months of patent expiration”). This is particularly true because
Festo’s applicability may be so straightforward that Innovator declines to bring Hatch-Waxman
litigation against Generic.
146. For a discussion of the Hatch-Waxman Act’s influence on the pharmaceutical industry,
see supra Part I.C.
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manufacturers preferentially attack non-AI patents, particularly
148
formulation patents. Additionally, because it is often alleged that
innovative firms increasingly adopt the so-called “evergreening”
strategy in which they obtain additional non-AI patents on related
products with the same active ingredients to extend market
exclusivity after the AI patent expires, some scholars argue that PIV
challenges, through specifically targeting and practically eliminating
those “non-meritorious” patents, provide a mechanism to balance this
149
“evergreening” strategy.
One possible implication of these observations is that the failure
of innovative firms to cope with pervasive PIV challenges may not be
a sign of the patent system’s failure to provide adequate protection.
Rather, it may indicate that the system is working properly to exclude
150
“non-meritorious” patents. Granted, the limitation of the doctrine
of equivalents does not affect AI patents as much as it affects non-AI
patents, as designing around an active ingredient can be extremely
difficult.
This viewpoint, however, is problematic, mainly because non-AI
patents, although narrower in scope, do not inherently merit less
protection than AI patents. First, products protected by non-AI
patents, such as improved formulations or new indications, still
151
require substantial R&D investment. A reasonable prospect of
patent-protected market exclusivity for these products is also
necessary to incentivize investment in their development. Second, a
start-up drug company sometimes must rely exclusively on non-AI
patents because the core active ingredients are unpatentable due to
152
inadvertent premature disclosure. Although non-AI patents might

147. See Hemphill & Sampat, supra note 4, at 643 (“Non-AI patents have a strong positive
relationship with challenges, especially those generating extra nominal patent term.”).
148. See id. at 621 (“In comparison to AI patents, patents for particular formulations—for
example, a chemical mechanism providing sustained release of the drug substance over time—
are more open to attack.”).
149. Hemphill & Sampat, supra note 86, at 337 (“[PIV] challenges may reflect society’s
strongest defense against non-meritorious patents that would harm payers and patients.”).
150. Id.
151. See Grabowski & Moe, supra note 20, at 85 (“Even after a product is approved for
marketing, extensive R&D expenditures are frequently undertaken for new indications and
improved formulations. Studies to establish new indications typically involve expenditures of
well over $100 million but can be substantially greater . . . .”).
152. See Benjamin N. Roin, Unpatentable Drugs and the Standards of Patentability, 87 TEX.
L. REV. 503, 517 (2009) (“[I]t is not uncommon for new drugs to be disclosed prematurely such
that they cannot be patented later.”).
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yield some hope for the developers of these products, this hope is
much diminished because non-AI patents are vulnerable targets of
153
PIV challenges. Indeed, pharmaceutical companies are known to
screen out potential drug candidates for which they cannot get an AI
154
patent due to unintended disclosure.
155
Finally, as also noted in the 2011 study, these so-called “weak”
non-AI patents provide incremental benefit to the brand-name firms,
and it is questionable “whether, absent the incremental protection
provided by these weak patents, brand-name firms would have
156
sufficient incentives to invest in socially valuable research.” Indeed,
many important drug products rely on formulation patents or
157
method-of-use patents. Therefore, the “just merit” of a patent—that
is, the amount of protection the patent deserves—is more
appropriately decided by a case-by-case analysis rather than by
labeling it as either an AI patent or a non-AI patent. Non-AI patents
also deserve adequate protection, which the current system does not
afford due to the undue restriction on the doctrine of equivalents.
In summary, the recent decline in pharmaceutical innovation
suggests that the patent system provides inadequate financial
incentives for innovation. At a minimum, the sharp increase in PIV
challenges and the restrictive application of the doctrine of
equivalents have contributed to this inadequacy. In general, patent
protection has two independent dimensions: the time (effective
patent life) and the scope (coverage of patent claims). In recent years,
the effective life for drug patents has become partially dependent on
adequate patent scope because of the popularity of PIV challenges.
When innovative firms lose a PIV challenge for noninfringement, the
effective life for that patent term is over with respect to at least that
generic challenger, even if the validity and enforceability of that
patent is still upheld.

153. See supra notes 147–148 and accompanying text.
154. See Roin, supra note 152, at 507 (“[I]t is not unusual for a pharmaceutical company to
sour on an otherwise promising drug candidate after their attorneys turn up a prior disclosure
that threatens its patent protection.”).
155. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
156. Hemphill & Sampat, supra note 4, at 643.
157. See Grabowski & Moe, supra note 20, at 87 (“It is worth noting that many important
drug products, such as the first AIDS therapy, AZT (zidovudine), relied on formulation or
methods of use patents because their product patents had already expired. This could also be
the case for many chemoprevention agents.”).

TANG IN FR (DO NOT DELETE)

1096

1/17/2013 4:43 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 62:1069

There are at least three possible solutions to this problem. To
spur pharmaceutical innovation, the industry needs (1) a more
effective parallel system to provide nonpatent protection for
inventors, such as a significantly longer data-exclusivity period for
brand-name drugs, (2) a less restrictive application of the doctrine of
equivalents with an attendant broader scope for pharmaceutical
158
patents, or (3) a wider application of MPF claims. The first
approach requires major legislative efforts to modify current drug
law, and the second approach requires a reversal of Supreme Court
jurisprudence on the issue of the doctrine of equivalents. In
comparison, the third approach—the application of MPF claims—is
simply an exercise of statutorily granted claiming strategy, can be
easily implemented, and may prove to be an efficient solution in
certain contexts.
III. APPLICATION OF CLAIMS WITH MEANS-PLUS-FUNCTION
CLAUSES IN PHARMACEUTICAL PATENTS
Means-plus-function clauses for patent claims were codified in
the 1952 Act, 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6 (now § 112(f)), which provides:
An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a
means or step for performing a specified function without the recital
of structure, material, or acts in support thereof, and such claim shall
be construed to cover the corresponding structure, material, or acts
159
described in the specification and equivalents thereof.

This provision consists of two parts. The first expressly
authorizes a patent applicant to claim an element of a combination by
160
its function, rather than by its structure. The second provides
161
guidance on construction of claims including such elements. As
prescribed in the statute, the literal scope of an MPF claim covers the
162
“corresponding structure . . . and equivalents thereof.”
158. MPF claims, although authorized in the 1952 Act, have not been explored much in
pharmaceutical patents.
159. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006), amended by Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No.
112-29, § 4(c), 125 Stat. 284, 296 (2011). Note that the America Invents Act does not change this
provision substantively.
160. See id. (“An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a means or step
for performing a specified function without the recital of structure, material, or acts in support
thereof . . . .”).
161. See id. (“[S]uch claim shall be construed to cover the corresponding structure, material,
or acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof.”).
162. Id.

TANG IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

1/17/2013 4:43 PM

MEANS-PLUS-FUNCTION PATENT CLAUSES

1097

Consequently, with the doctrine of equivalents not in play, the literal
scope of a purely structural claim does not cover a product that
contains a slight variation to the claimed structure, whereas that of an
MPF claim does, as long as the product serves the same function and
163
contains an equivalent structure as the claimed invention.
Therefore, the special nature of an MPF clause makes this claim
strategy a promising solution to rectify the problem of inadequate
claim scope by providing a broader literal claim scope.
Although authorized by Congress sixty years ago, MPF claims
have barely been explored in the pharmaceutical industry. The special
nature of MPF claims, however, has generated certain interpretative
164
or logical difficulties when applied in other technology fields. This
Part briefly reviews the legal foundation of MPF claims, analyzes
their potential in promoting pharmaceutical innovation, and discusses
issues that might arise during their application.
A. The Rationale Behind MPF Claims
To provide more flexibility in claim drafting, Congress included
§ 112 ¶ 6 in the 1952 Act to specifically authorize applications for
165
MPF claims. Patent law has never strictly required nonfunctional
166
Functional language can offer
language for patent claims.
advantages over pure structural description in certain contexts and
has been accepted by courts long before the codification of MPF
167
claims.
163. See infra note 188 and accompanying text.
164. See supra note 31.
165. See Bradley, supra note 31, at 2 (“In response to the [Halliburton Oil Well Cementing
Co. v. Walker, 329 U.S. 1 (1946),] decision, Congress enacted the . . . provision, now codified as
§ 112, paragraph 6 to authorize the use of means-plus-function clauses . . . .”); Rudolph P.
Hofmann, Jr. & Edward P. Heller, III, The Rosetta Stone for the Doctrines of Means-PlusFunction Patent Claims, 23 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 227, 243 (1997) (“By far the
most accepted reason [for the enactment of § 112(f)] is that the drafters intended to overrule the
Supreme Court’s decision in Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Walker.”).
166. Hofmann & Heller, supra note 165, at 245. Prior to the 1952 Act, the Supreme Court
briefly invalidated patents written in means-plus-function format and forbade claims that “use
‘conveniently functional language at the exact point of novelty.’” Halliburton, 329 U.S. at 8–9
(quoting Gen. Elec. Co. v. Wabash Appliance Corp., 304 U.S. 364, 371 (1938)). The Supreme
Court’s objection was not to functional claim language in general, but to its particular
application at the “point of novelty.” Id. at 8. Nonetheless, the 1952 Act specifically overrode
Halliburton. See Patent Act, ch. 950, § 112, 66 Stat. 792, 798 (1952) (codified as amended at 35
U.S.C. § 112 (2006)) (allowing for MPF claims), amended by Leahy-Smith America Invents Act,
Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 4(c), 125 Stat. 284, 296 (2011).
167. In the case of Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 252 (1854), the Supreme Court
examined a patent claim written with functional language and held that the claim should be
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Both the statutory language and the legislative history of the
1952 Act clearly indicate that § 112 ¶ 6 was enacted to provide a
drafting option to patent prosecutors. Pasquale J. Federico, an
Examiner-in-Chief at the USPTO who wrote the first draft of the
1952 Act, stated that “[i]t is unquestionable that some measure of
greater liberality in the use of functional expressions in combination
168
claims is authorized.” Contrary to the drafter’s intention, however,
the application of the second half of § 112 ¶ 6 has become more
commonly sought by alleged infringers as a way to narrow claim
169
scope and avoid liability in litigation since the 1990s.
B. The Potential for MPF Claims in Pharmaceutical Patents
MPF claims hold great potential for pharmaceutical patents for
several reasons. First, based on the nature of pharmaceutical patents,
application of MPF claims was actually contemplated by the drafters
of the 1952 Act. Second, an MPF claim can be more commensurate in
scope with a disclosed invention than a pure structural claim, offering
clarity and better notice to the public. Finally, wider application of
MPF claims in pharmaceutical patents can provide a solution to the
problem of inadequate patent scope as highlighted in Part II, which
may in turn enable the patent system to more efficiently promote
pharmaceutical innovation.
First, the application of MPF claims in pharmaceutical patents
fits the intentions of the drafters of the 1952 Act because both drugproduct claims and method-of-use claims can include at least one
functional element. In describing the application of § 112 ¶ 6,
Federico emphasized that one or more functional elements can be
applied in a claim for a combination, which “may be not only a
combination of mechanical elements, but also a combination of

construed to cover the machine disclosed in the specification that performed the function, see id.
at 269 (“The patent of Burden alleges no discovery of a new process, but only that he has
invented a machine, and, therefore, correctly states the nature of his invention.”). The fact that
the Court did not reject the validity of the patent claim indicated that it permitted the use of
functional language. In Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405
(1908), the Supreme Court again held that the claimed “operating means” for a particular
functional purpose covered both the corresponding machine in the specification that achieved
the stated purpose and the machine’s equivalents, id. at 417, 422.
168. P.J. Federico, Commentary on the New Patent Act, 75 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.
SOC’Y 161, 186 (1993).
169. See Triggs, supra note 31, at 31 (“[O]ver the last 15 years, the way courts have
identified and treated such § 112 ¶ 6 functional claims has evolved as a way to limit the patent
rights.”).
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substances in a composition claim, or steps in a process claim.” As
described in Part II.C, most pharmaceutical patents fall into one of
three major categories: drug-substance patents, drug-product
(formulation and composition) patents, and method-of-use
171
(therapeutic indications) patents. Both drug-product claims and
method-of-use claims are the most likely claims for combinations that
can include one or more functional elements, especially formulation
drug-product claims.
Second, functional language can add accuracy and clarity to a
patent in certain situations, providing the public with clear notice of
the boundaries of the claim. Patent claims are statutorily required to
be supported by a written description and be commensurate in scope
172
with the enabling disclosure. Importantly, the language should be
sufficiently clear to provide notice to the public regarding what has
173
been claimed and what can still be freely explored. As the
legislative history of the 1952 Act suggests, the special authorization
of MPF claims was also partly motivated by the ability of those claims
174
to describe an invention more precisely than structural claims.
Again consider the formulation claim of drug X that comprises
three elements: active ingredients A and B, plus a carrier C that
improves the absorption of A. Assume that the essence of the
invention is the discovery that the inefficient absorption of A
significantly reduces the efficacy of the drug, and that carrier C cures
this defect through a novel mechanism. A claim element stating “a
means for improving absorption of A” that is construed by linking the
improved absorption to carrier C in the specification would more
accurately capture the essence of the invention than would an
element merely describing the structure of C. Moreover, the

170. Federico, supra note 168, at 186 (emphasis added).
171. See supra text accompanying note 136.
172. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006), amended by Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No.
112-29, § 4(c), 125 Stat. 284, 296 (2011).
173. See id. (“The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing
out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the inventor or joint inventor regards as the
invention.”).
174. See Patent Law Codification and Revision: Hearing on H.R. 3760 Before H. Subcomm.
No. 3 of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 82d Cong. 71 (1951) (statement of Cecil C. Kent, Esq.,
Fetherstonhaugh & Kent) (“[F]unctional form of claim . . . is the most perfect way to define a
given structure with deductive inevitability. And it has the advantage of clearness of meaning.
This greater clearness of meaning arises from the fact that a common, already existing
word . . . cannot bring a definite understanding about unknown structure, and every invention
involves some unknown or new structure naturally.”).
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functional language clarifies to potential competitors that the patent
covers a drug comprising A, B, and a carrier that is the structural
equivalent to C that improves A’s absorption just as C does.
Therefore, the functional language enables the claim to more
precisely define the invention, providing the public with clear notice
of the literal boundaries of what has been claimed.
Finally, MPF claims provide a potential cure for the problem of
inadequate scope for pharmaceutical patents. In the previous
hypothetical, with the information provided in Innovator’s patent,
Generic developed drug X1—the generic version of X—with the
substitution of carrier C with C1, which is a structural equivalent to C
and improves A’s absorption in the same manner as C. If the patent is
limited to a composition comprising A, B, and C, Innovator likely
cannot exclude X1 from the market due to the difficulty in proving
infringement, particularly based on the Festo presumption of estoppel
if Innovator’s original claim, describing carriers that encompassed
more than C, was narrowed during prosecution to describe carrier C
175
only.
The outcome, however, can be different if the claim is framed
with a means-plus-function clause. Instead of claiming a composition
comprising A, B, and C, Innovator can claim a composition
comprising A, B, and a means for improving A’s absorption. The
infringement analysis for X1 will not depend on the doctrine of
equivalents because a court will likely find that X1 literally infringes
the patent on X, as long as Innovator can establish (1) that C1 is a
structural equivalent of C, and (2) that C1 serves the identical
176
function as C.
Thus, an easy change in claiming style can
substantially improve the economic consequences for the Innovator.
With structural claiming of specific elements of a formulation,
such as the drug product, a patent may be practically useless in
protecting Innovator’s interest. Innovator will likely lose the market
for its drug-product formulation soon after the regulatory exclusivity
ends. By contrast, with MPF claims, Innovator has a higher chance
both of successfully defending a PIV challenge through asserting
literal infringement by the challenger’s bioequivalent formulation and
of ultimately enjoying the full statutory patent term of the
formulation patent. Therefore, in the current industry—one in which
pharmaceutical patents are constantly challenged by generic
175. See supra Part II.C.
176. See infra Part III.C.2.
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manufacturers and patent scope of drug-product formulations can be
unduly restricted to the literal scope of the elements recited in the
formulation—statutorily granted MPF claims may offer more
adequate protection to the innovators. Such protection could then
translate into enhanced financial incentives to continue R&D
investment in new medicine.
C. Issues Anticipated for the Application of MPF Claims to
Pharmaceutical Patents
The patent system is still in search of the optimal standard for
177
identifying and construing MPF claims. A number of issues have
178
arisen during the application of § 112 ¶ 6 in other contexts. Similar
issues can be anticipated when incorporating MPF claims into
pharmaceutical patents. The potential issues fall into three categories:
(1) when to invoke § 112 ¶ 6, (2) whether an MPF claim is infringed
by a particular product, and (3) whether an MPF claim is patentable
over the prior art.
1. When Is § 112 ¶ 6 Invoked? The USPTO has provided the
following three-prong guideline on this threshold question:
Examiners will apply § 112, ¶ 6 to a claim limitation that meets the
following conditions: (1) The claim limitation uses the phrase
“means for” or “step for” or a non-structural term that does not have
a structural modifier; (2) the phrase “means for” or “step for” or the
non-structural term recited in the claim is modified by functional
language; and (3) the phrase “means for” or “step for” or the nonstructural term recited in the claim is not modified by sufficient
179
structure, material, or acts for achieving the specified function.

177. See Cyrill P. Rigamonti, Conflicting Theories of Equivalence: 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6 in the
Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit, 40 IDEA 163, 164 (2000) (“[T]he Supreme Court and
the Federal Circuit rely on two completely different theories when reading 35 U.S.C. § 112,
para. 6.”); Triggs, supra note 31, at 31 (“More problematically, neither the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office (USPTO) nor the courts have developed a workable test to identify claims
subject to the §112 ¶ 6 restriction, especially in a method claim.”).
178. See generally Bradley, supra note 31 (discussing the genesis of the equivalence standard
under § 112 ¶ 6 and arguing that means-plus-function equivalence is no different than
equivalence as defined in the doctrine of equivalents); Triggs, supra note 31, at 33–35 (detailing
the numerous lines of cases in which courts have adopted different approaches to the
application of § 112 ¶ 6 to method claims).
179. Supplementary Examination Guidelines for Determining Compliance with 35 U.S.C.
112 and for Treatment of Related Issues in Patent Applications, 76 Fed. Reg. 7162, 7167 (Feb. 9,
2011).
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This guideline establishes that the trigger for the application of
§ 112 ¶ 6 lies in the claim language itself. A claim element is treated
as a means-plus-function limitation if it is written in nonstructural
terms, preferably as “means for” or as “step for,” with a functional
180
statement but no structural description. According to the statute,
181
any structural modifier or structural description of the element
could potential disqualify a patent applicant from invoking § 112
182
¶ 6. The administration of this three-prong rule should be relatively
straightforward with composition claims but might be more difficult
183
with method claims.
During prosecution, the patent applicant is responsible for
making clear whether a claim limitation invokes § 112 ¶ 6; failing to
184
clarify this might result in a rejection of the claim for indefiniteness.
When an ambiguity of this nature is found in litigation, courts are to
decide the applicability of § 112 ¶ 6 based on the judgment of “a
185
person with ordinary skill in the relevant field.”

180. Id.
181. To determine whether a modifier denotes structure,
examiners should check whether: (1) [t]he specification provides a description
sufficient to inform one of ordinary skill in the art that the term denotes structure;
(2) general and subject matter specific dictionaries provide evidence that the term has
achieved recognition as a noun denoting structure; and (3) the prior art provides
evidence that the term has an art-recognized structure to perform the claimed
function.
Id.
182. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006) (“An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed
as a means or step for performing a specified function without the recital of structure, material,
or acts in support thereof . . . .” (emphasis added)), amended by Leahy-Smith America Invents
Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 4(c), 125 Stat. 284, 296 (2011); see also Supplementary Examination
Guidelines for Determining Compliance with 35 U.S.C. 112 and for Treatment of Related Issues
in Patent Applications, 76 Fed. Reg. at 7167 (“Examiners will apply § 112, ¶6 to a claim
limitation . . . unless the non-structural term is (1) preceded by a structural modifier . . . or
(2) modified by sufficient structure or material for achieving the claimed function.”).
183. See Seal-Flex, Inc. v. Athletic Track & Court Constr., 172 F.3d 836, 848–49 (Fed. Cir.
1999) (Rader, J., concurring) (“[I]dentifying step-plus-function claims [is] inherently more
problematic.”); Triggs, supra note 31, at 31 (“[N]either the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
(USPTO) nor the courts have developed a workable test to identify claims subject to the § 112
para. 6 restriction, especially in a method claim.”). Method claims are inherently more difficult
partly because it is hard to distinguish whether a step of a method is expressed as a step for
performing a specified function without the recital of any act in support of such function.
184. See Supplementary Examination Guidelines for Determining Compliance with 35
U.S.C. 112 and for Treatment of Related Issues in Patent Applications, 76 Fed. Reg. at 7167
(“When it is unclear whether a claim limitation invokes § 112, ¶ 6 or not, a rejection under
§ 112, ¶ 2 may be appropriate.”).
185. Rowe Int’l Corp. v. Ecast, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 2d 924, 951 (N.D. Ill. 2008).
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2. Determining Infringement in Litigation.
Two types of
infringement exist for any patent claim: literal infringement and
186
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. Section 112 ¶ 6
provides a test for literal infringement, but not for infringement under
187
the doctrine of equivalents.
Because the literal infringement
analysis of MPF claims involves identification of structural
“equivalents” of embodiments disclosed in the specification,
confusion could result if MPF claims were subjected to an
infringement analysis under the doctrine of equivalents.
In an ordinary literal-infringement analysis, courts only need to
examine whether the accused product or process contains all
structures or acts as literally provided in the claim elements. For MPF
claims, because the claim language describes function instead of
structure or an act, an additional step is needed to link the structure
or act in the specification to the function described in the claim.
Based on the language in the 1952 Act, the Federal Circuit has held
that an accused product or process contains the element as described
in a means-plus-function clause if (1) it contains a structure that is
equivalent to the structure disclosed in the specification
corresponding to the functional limitation, and (2) the equivalent
188
structure performs the same function that is stated in the claim. For
example, in the previous hypothetical, if the patent for drug X claims
a composition containing A, B, and C, which is a means for improving
A’s absorption, then the generic drug X1 which contains A, B, and C1
literally infringes the patent if (1) C1 is a structural equivalent of C,
and (2) C1 performs the same function as C in promoting A’s
absorption.
The issue of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents is
logically more difficult than the issue of direct infringement, and
commentators have disagreed about whether and how the doctrine
189
should apply to MPF claims. In WMS Gaming, Inc. v. International
186. See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 21 (1997) (“[A]
product or process that does not literally infringe upon the express terms of a patent claim may
nonetheless be found to infringe if there is ‘equivalence’ between the elements of the accused
product or process and the claimed elements of the patented invention.” (quoting Graver Tank
& Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 609 (1950))).
187. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (stating that MPF claims “shall be construed to cover the
corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents
thereof”).
188. Cortland Line Co. v. Orvis Co., 203 F.3d 1351, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
189. At least three different approaches have been proposed on this issue. Some scholars
argue that § 112 ¶ 6 only concerns literal infringement; therefore, the doctrine of equivalents
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190

Game Technology,
the Federal Circuit provided an in-depth
analysis of this issue and held that the doctrine of equivalents does
191
apply to MPF claims. In dealing with the difficult issue of
“equivalents of equivalent,” the court distinguished between the
literal scope and the equivalent scope of an MPF claim using two
192
related concepts: structural equivalents and functional equivalents.
The court reasoned that the literal scope of an MPF claim covers
devices containing a structural equivalent that serves the identical
function as stated in the claim; and the doctrine of equivalents
extends the claim to cover devices employing a structural equivalent
193
that serves an equivalent, but not identical, function. Under this
analysis, if carrier C1 has an equivalent, but not identical, function to
that of C, drug X1 could infringe the patent claim on X under the
doctrine of equivalents, but not literally. This approach is most
consistent with the two-step infringement analysis under Warner194
Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co. In addition, it promotes
195
equity and efficacy of the patent system.
3. Patentability Issues During Prosecution. To procure a patent
containing an MPF claim, the applicant first needs to convince the
USPTO that her invention is patentable. Similar patentability issues
might arise during litigation as well, when courts examine the
should be precluded after a finding of no literal infringement. Chad S.C. Stover, Comment,
Deciphering Means-Plus-Function Claim Limitation Infringement Under § 112, Paragraph 6:
Finding Certainty in the Uncertain Case Law, 3 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 101, 107 (2001). Others
believe that “the means-plus-function clause should be accorded the scope of equivalence
allowed by the traditional doctrine of equivalents,” basically eliminating the difference between
literal infringement and equivalent infringement for § 112 ¶ 6 claims. See, e.g., Bradley, supra
note 31, at 16 (noting that this interpretation “would eliminate . . . the double standard of
equivalence”). Finally, some suggest that if a § 112 ¶ 6 claim is not literally infringed only
because the structural equivalent in the accused device performs substantially the same—but
not exactly the same—function as the claim provides, it may still be found to have been
infringed under the doctrine of equivalents. See, e.g., John N. Kandara, Note, Application of the
Doctrine of Equivalents to Means Plus Function Claims: WMS Gaming Inc. v. International
Game Technology, 50 DUKE L.J. 887, 905–15 (2000) (arguing, inter alia, that this interpretation
promotes fundamental fairness).
190. WMS Gaming, Inc. v. Int’l Game Tech., 184 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
191. Id. at 1353–54.
192. See id. at 1353 (“[A]n accused device can infringe under the doctrine of equivalents
without infringing literally under 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6 because the doctrine only requires
substantially the same function, not identicality of function as in section 112, ¶ 6.”).
193. Id.
194. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997). For a discussion
of this two-step analysis, see supra notes 109–110 and accompanying text.
195. Kandara, supra note 189, at 889.
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challenged patent under the same statutory criteria used by the patent
196
examiner at the USPTO. When MPF claims were first authorized by
the 1952 Act, Federico stated that the second part of the § 112 ¶ 6
provision applied only in infringement analysis but not in
197
patentability analysis. Consequently, the USPTO did not engage in
patentability analysis of MPF claims over the prior art for more than
forty years. In 1994, the Federal Circuit finally held that § 112 ¶ 6
applies both to patentability examination during prosecution and to
infringement or validity analysis during litigation in the landmark
198
case In re Donaldson Co. Because the patentability issues during
prosecution were not even recognized for more than forty years, and
because MPF claims remain barely explored in pharmaceutical
patents, some challenging issues might arise during prosecution.
A claim can be unpatentable because of prior art if, in accord
with its broadest reasonable construction, the claim is more 1ikely
199
than not (1) anticipated by prior art, or (2) rendered obvious by
200
prior art. The anticipation issue is relatively straightforward: “A
claim is anticipated only if each and every element as set forth in the
claim is found, either expressly or inherently described, in a single
201
prior art reference.” An MPF claim requires an additional inquiry
to determine whether a functional element is present in the prior art.
For this purpose, the USPTO has provided a three-part rule in the
202
Manual of Patent Examining Procedure. Similar to the infringement
196. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–103, 112 (2006) (detailing the criteria for patentability), amended
by Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, §§ 3(b)(1), (c), (n), 4(c), 125 Stat. 284,
285, 287, 293, 296 (2011). Significant differences, however, exist between evaluation of a claim
during prosecution and litigation. During prosecution, the USPTO adopts the broadest
reasonable construction of a patent application claim and must show that, more likely than not,
the claim is not patentable. In re Baxter Int’l, Inc., 678 F.3d 1357, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2012). In
litigation, owing to the presumption of validity of the patent, the alleged infringer is stuck with
whatever claim construction comes out of the Markman hearing and then has the burden to
show invalidity and/or unenforceability by clear and convincing evidence of the claim as so
construed. Invitrogen Corp. v. Biocrest Mfg., L.P., 424 F.3d 1374, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
197. Federico, supra note 168, at 186–87.
198. In re Donaldson Co., 16 F.3d 1189 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
199. See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (defining statutory novelty).
200. See id. § 103 (defining statutory obviousness). In general, this will be also true under
the America Invents Act, except that the anticipatory prior art has a different definition with
specific exceptions, and the § 103 analysis will be performed as of the effective filing date of the
claimed invention and not at the date of invention. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, § 3(b)–
(c), 125 Stat. at 2855–78 (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. §§ 102–103).
201. Verdegaal Bros., Inc. v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 814 F.2d 628, 631 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
202. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE
§ 2183 (9th rev. 2012), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/mpep-2100.pdf.
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analysis, the functional element is found in prior art when an
“equivalent” is identified—that is, when “the examiner finds that a
prior art element (A) performs the function specified in the claim, (B)
is not excluded by any explicit definition provided in the specification
for an equivalent, and (C) is an equivalent of the means-(or step-)
203
plus-function limitation.”
The obviousness issue for MPF claims, however, is more
complicated and lacks regulatory guidance. Nonetheless, developing a
test for obviousness for MPF claims requires no more than following
the well-established standard with some consideration for the special
nature of MPF claims. In general, an invention is unpatentable if the
differences between it and the prior art “are such that the subject
matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention
204
was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art.” Importantly,
one inquiry to make is “whether the improvement is more than the
predictable use of prior-art elements according to their established
205
functions.”
Accordingly, with respect to an MPF claim, the
threshold question in determining obviousness should be whether the
prior-art element was known to carry the identical or equivalent
function as provided in the claim at the time of invention. If the
function was unknown, then the invention is nonobvious; if the
function was known, then the inquiry should be whether it is obvious
to those skilled in the art to combine this prior art with other
206
references to arrive at the claimed invention.
In the previous hypothetical, assume Innovator is pursuing a
patent application with a claim of composition comprising A, B, and
C, which is a means to improve the absorption of A. The specification
provides a description of C and its function in improving A’s
absorption. Further assume that A, B, and C are all found in three
separate prior-art references, and the question is whether the prior
art, combined, renders the claimed invention obvious. The threshold
inquiry should be whether C was known to improve A’s absorption at
207
the time of invention. If not, then the invention is not obvious, and

203. Id.
204. 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
205. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 417 (2007) (emphasis added).
206. See supra note 204 and accompanying text.
207. The America Invents Act provides that U.S. patents with claims having an effective
filing date on or after March 16, 2013, will be generally granted to the “first-inventor-to-file.”
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, § 3(n), 125 Stat. at 293. Under the new law, the proper
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that should be the end of the inquiry. Only when C was known for
this function should the analysis proceed to the next question of
whether it is obvious to a person skilled in the art to combine the
three references. If yes, then arguably the prima facie obviousness of
the claim is established.
In summary, MPF claims, as authorized by the 1952 Act, have
great potential applications in pharmaceutical patents. These claims
can add clarity to a patent and can provide the patent with a broader
literal scope to confer effective protection. Due to the historical lack
of use of MPF claims in composition patents, the law is still evolving
and a number of issues will need to be resolved in the future.
Nonetheless, prosecutors for drug patents should consider using MPF
claims for the reasons described here.
CONCLUSION
The industrial trend of cutting R&D budgets and the drying up
of new product pipelines in innovative firms signify diminished future
innovation, which means not only fewer life-saving drugs for the
public but also a loss for local and national economies. From a
broader perspective, the lack of sufficient financial incentives is by no
means the only reason behind the shortage of pharmaceutical
innovation. Solutions need to be found to reduce the high cost of drug
development, and new models of R&D are needed to improve the
efficiency of the system that frames innovation within the industry.
Nonetheless, the patent system has traditionally played an
indispensable role in incentivizing pharmaceutical innovation, and the
current lack of investment suggests an inadequacy of the system that
must be cured.
Since the enactment of the Hatch-Waxman Act, PIV challenges
have become pervasive and scholars have criticized their negative
effect on innovative firms, especially in the form of shortened
208
effective lives for patents. Many have proposed an extension of the
209
regulatory-exclusivity period as a solution. The other dimension of
inquiry will be whether C was known to improve A’s absorption at the time of the effective
filing date of the claimed invention. See supra note 200.
208. See Higgins & Graham, supra note 4, at 371 (“These [PIV] challenges . . . shorten
patent life.”); Wilson, supra note 18, at 506 (“[T]he Drug Price Competition and Patent Term
Restoration Act of 1984 actually results in shorter effective patent terms.” (footnote omitted)).
209. See, e.g., Grabowski & Moe, supra note 20, at 88 (proposing “a longer exclusivity time
for new drugs as well as biologicals”); Gerald J. Mossinghoff, supra note 18, at 192 (proposing
“chang[ing] the five-year data exclusivity to ten years in accordance with international
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the issue—inadequate patent scope—should not be ignored because it
greatly exacerbates the problems created by the prevalence of PIV
challenges. Under the current jurisprudence regarding the doctrine of
equivalents, many patent claims are limited to their literal scope and
are therefore easily designed around and incapable of providing
effective protection to innovators to stimulate investment. Therefore,
MPF claims, which can provide a more appropriate scope of
protection under the restrictive application of the doctrine of
equivalents, are well-placed for consideration as an efficient solution.

standards”); Alastair J.J. Wood, A Proposal for Radical Changes in the Drug-Approval Process,
355 NEW ENG. J. MED. 618, 620 (2006) (“[A]n extended period of exclusivity should be offered
to drug manufacturers . . . .”).

